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Abstract 
This research was carried out to test trend of earnings management in Indonesia. By 
understanding the trend of earnings management, it can be found out what scheme of 
earnings management practice in Indonesia. The sample used were thirty one non-
financial, hotel, travel, transportation and real estate companies that listed in Indonesia 
Stocks Exchange from 1991 to 2014. The time of observation was from 1993 to 2013. 
Research model was using multiple regression method. The result showed there was no 
trend increasing of accrual earnings management during research period. Practice of 
accrual earnings management in Indonesia that tends fluctuate shows there is a tradeoff 
or substitution of earnings management technique from accrual to real earnings 
management. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
A nation’s stock market can be sturdy because of investor trusts. For most 
investor, earnings are considered critical information in making investment decision. 
Unfortunately, this information is often mislead by managers for their personal welfare 
by executing earnings management. 
Managers search any gaps for conducting earnings management although 
regulators and accounting profession have issued rules to prevent such fraud. One of 
the proofs that shows the managers’ attempts to keep doing earnings management is by 
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doing earnings management movement techniques (Graham et al., 2005 and Cohen et 
al., 2008). Zang (2007) proves that managers use real earnings management and 
accrual earnings management interchangeably (substitution) and Cohen et al. (2008) 
find that managers replace accrual earnings management techniques with the real 
earnings management after the period of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act(SOX). 
Graham et al. (2005) find evidence that managers in the United States prefer 
the real earnings management than accrual earnings management practices, with the 
aim to meet certain earnings targets. A tendency to choose the real earnings 
management practices is due to the accounting fraud conducted by the Enron company 
detected and the regulations of SOX. 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act regulation indeed gives a huge influence on earnings 
management practices in the United States, as described by Henry Paulson, the former 
finance minister of the United States. One of the main objectives of the SOX 
regulations is to inhibit the earnings management practices and accounting fraud which 
lead to improve the integrity of the financial statements (Cohen et. al., 2008). 
Research by Cohen et al. (2008) reveal that SOX effectively minimizes the 
behavior of accrual earnings management. Because Indonesia has no comprehensive 
rule yet such as SOX, hopefully there is no incentive for managers to change their way 
in managing earning because accrual earning management is still wide open to 
perform. 
Based on research by Cohen et al. (2008), it was interesting to test trend of 
earnings management in Indonesia. By understanding well the trend of earnings 
management, it can be found out what scheme of earnings management practice in 
Indonesia. 
Therefore, this research proposed questions whether the trend of accrual 
earning management was increasing during period time of research. The aims of this 
research is give empirical evidence the increasing trend of accrual earnings 
management during period of time. 
This research, hopefully, contributes for rule decision and accounting 
standards makers to understand the effectiveness of rules and standards exist that may 
hinder the practice of earnings management. Furthermore, for the users of financial 
reports as their consideration basics to analyze firm’s financial report. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS  
 
Institutional Background 
Astring  of  major  account ting  scandals  began  with  the  unraveling  of  
Enron Corporation in late 2001. Enron’s activities over the preceding four years 
included the failure to make proper disclosures concerning various related-party 
transactions and to account for off-balance-sheet transactions. A number of criminal 
and civil investigations followed, along with the company’s bankruptcy filing. The 
various governance failures that followed Enron involved distinctly different types of 
misbehaviors, ranging from the widely publicized case of Global Crossing’s dubious 
financial reporting to that of Adelphia Communications Corp., and Tyco International 
Limited’s sweetheart loans to executives.
 
Figure 1 below provides a timeline of the 
major accounting scandals that occurred in 2001-2002. The dates of these scandals 
were obtained from Forbes’ “Corporate Scandal Sheet” (Penelope, 2002) and verified 
by checking the Dow Jones News Retrieval Services. These multi-billion dollar 
Trend and Tradeoff Between Accrual Earnings Management and Real Earnings 
Management In Indonesia 
 
161 
 
governance failures created losses for millions of ordinary investors and raised 
questions about the reliability of financial reporting. 
 
     October                      November   January February  
      200            2001 2002 2002  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Timeline Of The Major Scandals In 2001-2002 
 
One consequence of these events was the passage of SOX in 2002, the result of 
Congressional hearings conducted since the first admissions of fraudulent behavior 
made by Enron. President Bush signed SOX, also known as the Public Company 
Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002, into law on July 30, 2002. 
SOX introduces new provisions for management, directors, auditors and analysts, and 
significantly raises criminal penalties for securities fraud, for destroying, altering or 
fabricating records in federal investigations or any scheme or attempt to defraud 
shareholders. 
 Accounting scandal has relationship with earnings management because most of the 
scandal case by manage their earnings report. Such as: Enron using special purpose entities 
activities, Xerox use their asset account to manage their financial statement to manipulate 
their riil condition, etc.  
 
Earnings Management 
Roychowdhury (2006) explains that there are two ways of earnings 
management techniques, namely accrual manipulation and real activities manipulation. 
Accrual manipulation of earnings management (accrual earnings management) is 
manipulation done by managers to manipulate the discretionary accrual which has no 
effect or consequence to the cash flows directly. 
Managers usually do accrual earnings management at the end of the accounting 
period when knowing how big the profit target which has not been achieved. Accrual 
earnings management practices are limited by the accounting standards and the accrual 
manipulation from previous years. Other accrual earnings management weaknesses are 
it is easily detected by auditors, investors and regulators (government) which may 
result in a decrease in the company's stock price and may even lead to bankruptcy of 
the company, as happened in the Enron corporation. 
Real earnings management is a manipulation of the daily activities of the 
company during the current accounting period. Roychowdhury (2006) explains that 
managers tend to use real earnings management because it is difficult for auditors and 
regulators to detect whether it is the action of companies' strategy or indeed 
manipulation. Thus, profit targets which have to be achieved by the managers are more 
likely to be exceeded because it can be done throughout the operation period of the 
company. 
 
Trend of Earnings Management 
Cohen et. al. (2008) prove that there was an increase in the accrual earnings 
management practices in the period prior to The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) and 
Enron  Arthur  Kmart;  Global 
  Andersen  Homestore.com  Crossing; 
     
 Qwest      
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peaked around the financial scandal (2000 to 2001) and a decline in accrual earnings 
management practices after SOX. After the SOX, companies in America tend to choose 
the real earnings management because it is difficult to be detected by the auditors. 
Indonesia is a country that still has weak legal enforcement that making it has 
low protection for investor (Leuz et al., 2003) and has no comprehensive rule yet such 
as SOX. In addition, PABU (Indonesian GAAP) gives managers a wide freedom of 
action to choose accounting methods that finally leads company has space to perform 
accrual earnings management. 
We focus on one theory to explain earnings management behavior of firms, and 
its effect on the informativeness of earnings: the “opportunistic behavior  hypothesis” 
(OBH). OBH predicts that managers’ choices of accounting practices   are influenced 
by their impact on compensation. 
OBH has four empirical predictions. First, changes in reported earnings are 
affected by changes in the compensation and incentives of managers. Second, even 
after controlling for managerial incentives, OBH predicts that earnings management 
would decline after the passage of SOX, either because of the sanctions imposed on 
managers by the Act or because of the adverse publicity and legal costs imposed on 
executives and firms who were accused of fraudulent reporting practices. Third, 
earnings management is informative when managers possess inside information and  
have incentives to manage earnings (e.g., because of compensation contracts). 
 Therefore we expect an association between our proxy for earnings 
management and stock return volatility. Finally, the association between stock returns 
and earnings  surprises depends on investors’ perceptions on whether earnings 
management is motivated by managers’ attempts to communicate inside information or 
by managers opportunistic behavior. In the former (latter) case, higher earnings 
management will result in a given earnings surprise resulting in a larger (smaller) 
change in security prices.   
In other words, the level of earnings management affects the precision that 
investors attribute to a given earnings signal. In turn, the higher the precision of the 
earnings signal, the higher the earnings response (e.g., measurement errors bias 
 regression coefficient 
towards zero). Thus, there exists a link between earnings management and investors 
responses to earnings signals. 
 
Prior Studies 
Research documenting the trend in earnings management over time indicates 
that the tendency to manage earnings has increased over time (Brown, 2001; Bartov et. 
al., 2002; Lopez and Rees, 2001). This literature also provides evidence that managerial 
propensity to avoid negative earnings surprises has increased significantly over time 
(Brown, 2001; Bartov et. al, 2002; Matsumoto, 2002), although no significant increase 
has been observed in the tendency to avoid losses or earnings decreases (Burgstahler 
and Eames, 2003). 
Brown and Caylor (2003) conduct a temporal analyses of the propensities of 
managers to achieve three earnings management thresholds and their valuation 
consequences using quarterly data from 1985-2001. They find that early in their study 
period (1985-1993), managers tried to avoid losses and earnings decreases more than to 
avoid negative earnings surprises. However, in the subsequent time period (1994-2001) 
they find that managers exhibited a greater inclination to avoid negative earnings than 
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to avoid losses, and in the last six years of the study (1996-2001) managers preferred to 
avoid negative earnings surprises than earnings decreases. They conclude that 
managers took their cues from capital markets, making negative earnings surprise 
avoidance their most preferred threshold in recent years, proposing that increased 
media coverage may be responsible for this shift. 
In this paper we provide further evidence on the trend in earnings management 
activities of firms, with specific focus on the level of earnings management surrounding 
the period of heightened corporate misconduct, beginning in late 2001. 
Studies on the informativeness of earnings have typically focused on the relation 
between earnings informativeness and various institutional and governance features of 
companies. Yeo, Tan, Ho and Chen (2002) document a relation between 
informativeness and managerial ownership, as well as between informativeness and 
external block holdings. Gul and Wah (2002) focus on the market reaction to 
accounting earnings conditioned on two important corporate governance variables: 
insider entrenchment (high insider share ownership) and board leadership structure in 
terms of CEO duality (no separation between CEO and board chairman). They find that 
at a very high level of insider shareholding (entrenched insiders), is associated with a 
lower informativeness. Other studies provide evidence demonstrating an association 
between earnings informativeness and the levels of stock compensation (Behn, Nagy 
and Riley, 2005), the probability of termination of an entity, and the cost of equity and 
trading in the stock of a country (Bhattacharya, Daouk and Welker, 2002).  
 
Jain and Rezaee (2006) document positive abnormal returns around dates 
corresponding to the passage of SOX, suggesting that the market reacted positively to 
the passage of the Act and possible implementation effects of its provisions. They also 
report that firms with bigger balance sheet sizes, higher price-earnings ratios, and 
higher earnings The accrual earnings management on the hypothesis has absolute meaning, 
since the focus of this research was the magnitude of accrual earnings management, not its 
positive or negative direction. Accrual earnings management was chosen because easy ways to 
manage earnings by this practice was considered still wide open. Therefore, hopefully no firm 
incentive was given to shift accrual earnings management to real earnings management, 
because the latter needs high costs to implement. Thus the hypothesis was: 
 
H1 : The year increment has positive effect on increasing trend of accrual 
earnings management. 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
 
Research Population and Sample 
Companies which are the sample in this study are all companies listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) from 1991 to 2014 except for companies in financial 
services, hotel, travel, transportation, and real estate industries. The time of observation 
was from 1993 to 2013. The research used purposive sampling method. Criteria used in 
sampling are as follows: 
1. The companies were listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 1991 to 2014. 
2. The companies were not grouped into financial services industry. It is defined as the 
type of the financial industry which is very susceptible to regulation and has 
different accrual characteristics than do other industries. 
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3. The companies were not group into the type of hotel, travel, transportation and 
real estate industries. It is defined as the type of the industry which has 
different financial characteristics of the type of trade and manufacture 
industries. 
4. The financial data was available in a row from 1991 to2014. 
5. The company published audited financial statements ended in December, 31. 
Financial statement data were obtained from websites of the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange, Center for Stock Market Data of Economics and Business Faculty of 
Gadjah Mada University Yogyakarta, Faculty of Economics University of Atma Jaya 
Yogyakarta and Economics Faculty of the Islamic University of Indonesia Yogyakarta 
 
Definition and Variables Measurement 
1. Real Earnings Management 
Real earnings management was proxied by three variables. Cash flow from 
operations (R_CFO), abnormal production cost (R_PROD)  and abnormal discretionary 
cost (R_DISX) (Roychowdhury, 2006 and Cohen et al.,2008). 
 
a. Regression model for normal cash flow from operation is follow 
 
...................(1) 
 
 
     Abnormal CFO (R_CFO) = actual CFO – normal level CFO 
 
b. Regression model to estimate normal level COGS is : 
 
.....................................(2) 
 Regression model to estimate normal level of inventory growth: 
 
........(3) 
 
From equation (1) and (2) it can be estimated normal level of production cost. 
Regression model to estimate normal production cost level is as follow: 
                 
   
.......(4)     
 
                                                                                                                                  
 Abnormal production costs (R_PROD) = actual PROD – normal level PROD 
 
c. Model of normal level of discretionary expenses is as follow: 
                                                                                                                                               
 
Abnormal Discretionary Expenses (R_DISX) = actual DISX – normal level 
DISX. 
 
.................(5) 
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d. Real earnings management is calculated by totaling up standardized values from 
real earnings management variables. Firstly, value of R_CFO and R_DISX is multiplied 
by -1 (Cohen et al., 2008) 
 
2. Accrual Earnings Management 
Discretionary accruals is proxy of accrual earnings management. To calculate 
discretionary accruals, a model developed by Jones in 1991 as in Cohen et. al., (2008) 
was used. The discretionary accruals is calculated by regressing the following equation: 
 
...............................(6) 
         
Where:  
TACCit is companies’ total accrual i in time t;  
TAit  is the companies’ average total asset i in time t;  
ΔSALEit is the changing of company sales i in time t; 
ΔARit is  the  companies’  changing of  credit  i  in  time t;   
PPEit is companies’ fixed asset before decreased by depression (gross property, plant, 
and equipment) i in time t;  
all variables is divided by average total asset. 
 
The estimated residual value above is discretionary accruals for each observation. 
Furthermore, the value of discretionary accruals in this study is absolute (ABS_DA). 
The absolute value is used because the concern in this study is the amount of accrual 
earnings management (discretionary accrual), not the positive or negative direction. 
 
3. Trend of Earnings Management 
Formula to measure trend of earnings management is: 
 
TIME = Year t – Year 1993  (Cohen et.al.(2008)........................................(7) 
 
4. Control Variables 
Research by Cohen et al. (2008) included four control variables as he mentioned 
it as fundamental measures. Firm size (Ln_Assets) measured using natural log of 
company’s assets value at year end, leverage (Lev) by dividing total debt with total 
assets, growth of sales (GSales) that calculated by dividing the change of sales with 
total assets at early year, and market-to-book-ratios. 
The latest control variable wasn’t included because lack of data. 
 
Research Model 
Research model was using multiple regression method: 
ABS_DA = α+k1 Time + k2Ln_Assets + k3Lev + k4G.Sales + ε Where: 
ABS_DA = Absolute value of discretional accrual (accrual future earnings) 
Time  = Trend 
Assets      = Firm size 
Lev = Leverage 
GSales = Growth of sales 
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Α = Constanta 
K = Regression coefficient 
Ε = Error 
Ln = Natural logarithm 
 
Results and Discussion 
Results 
This study used a sample of thirty-one companies. The process of sample selection 
during research was shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
Process of Sample Selection 
No. Criteria Number of Company 
1. Number of public company listed in Indonesian Stock 
Exchange in 1991. 
124 
2. Number of company that not included in financial, hotel, 
travel, transportation and real estate industries 
79 
3. Number of company listed in Indonesian Stock 
Exchange from 1991 until 2014 
56 
4. Incomplete data (25) 
5. Companies used as final sample 31 
6. Total observation (21 years x 31 companies) 682 
 
Table 2 provides result of regression analysis from hypothesis test that 
examined trend of accrual earnings management. The result of regression analysis 
provided table 2 shows that variable time has insignificant effect on the increasing trend 
of accrual earnings management, with p-value 0,351, meaning that it’s bigger than0,05. 
The amount of the adjusted R-square is 0.037, this means a 3.7% variation 
accrual earnings management (ABS_DA) can be explained by the variation of the 
variable time, the size of the company (Ln_Assets), sales growth (GSales), and 
leverage (Lev). Meanwhile, the rest (100% -3.7% = 96.3%) is explained by other 
variables outside the model. 
This result shows that trend of accrual earnings management didn’t increase 
during research period, by means that accrual earnings management executed by firm 
was always change years to years. 
 
Table 2 
Analysis of Regression Result 
ABS_DA = α+k1 Time + k2Ln_Assets + k3Lev + k4G.Sales + ε 
Variable Prediction Coefficient Standard 
Error 
t-test Significance Conclusion 
(Constant)  0,307 0,084 3,668 0,000 - 
Time Positive -0,001 0,001 -0,933 0,351 Insignificant 
Ln-Assets Negative -0,008 0,003 -2,542 0,011 Significant* 
GSales Positive 0,021 0,009 2,462 0,014 Significant* 
Lev Positive 0,055 0,018 3,118 0,002 Significant* 
Adjusted R-square     0,037 
F-Statistic      6,104 
p-value (F-statistic)     0,000 
*(significant level at 5%) 
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Discussion 
The extensive literature on earnings management largely focuses on accrual-
based earnings management (reviewed by Schipper 1989; Healy and Wahlen 1999; 
Fields et al. 2001). A smaller stream of literature investigates the possibility that 
managers manipulate real transactions to distort earnings. Many such studies examine 
managerial discretion over R&D expenditures (Dechow and Sloan 1991; Bushee 1998; 
Cheng 2004). Other types of real activities manipulation that have been explored 
include cutting advertising expenditures (Cohen et al. 2010), stock repurchases (Hribar 
et al. 2006), sales of profitable assets (Herrmann et al. 2003; Bartov 1993), sales price 
reductions (Jackson and Wilcox 2000), derivative hedging (Barton 2001; Pincus and 
Rajgopal 2002), debt-equity swaps (Hand 1989), and securitization (Dechow and 
Shakespeare 2009). 
 
The prevalence of real activities manipulation as an earnings management tool 
was not well understood until recent years. Graham et al. (2005) survey more than 400 
executives and document the widespread use of real activities manipulation. Eighty 
percent of the CFOs in their survey stated that, in order to meet an earnings target, they 
would decrease expenditure on R&D, advertising, and maintenance, while 55 percent 
said they would postpone a new project, even if such delay caused a small loss in firm 
value. Consistent with this survey, Roychowdhury (2006) documents large-sample 
evidence suggesting that managers avoid reporting annual losses or missing analyst 
forecasts by manipulating sales, reducing discretionary expenditures, and 
overproducing inventory to decrease the cost of goods sold, all of which are deviations 
from otherwise optimal operational decisions, with the intention of biasing earnings 
upward. 
 
Recent research has started to examine the consequence of real activities 
manipulation. Gunny (2010) finds that firms that just meet earnings benchmarks by 
engaging in real activities manipulation have better operating performance in the 
subsequent three years than do firms that do not engage in real activities manipulation 
and miss or just meet earnings benchmarks. Bhojraj et al. (2009), on the other hand, 
show that firms that beat analyst forecasts by using real and accrual earnings 
management have worse operating performance and stock market performance in the 
subsequent three years than firms that miss analyst forecasts without earnings 
management. 
 
Most previous research on earnings management examines only one earnings 
management tool in settings where earnings management is likely to occur (e.g., Healy 
1985; Dechow and Sloan 1991; Roychowdhury 2006). However, given the portfolio of 
earnings management strategies, managers probably use multiple techniques at the 
same time. A few prior studies (Beatty et al. 1995; Hunt et al. 1996; Gaver and 
Paterson 1999; Barton 2001; Pincus and Rajgopal 2002; Cohen). 
Therefore, empirical evidence did not support the hypothesis. It can be seen from graphic 
of accrual earnings management trend (on average) from 1993 until 2013 as provided by 
graphic 2. 
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Figure 2 
Trend of Absolute Discretionary Accruals 
 
This research also revealed that there is tradeoff (substitution) between real 
earnings management and accrual earnings management as shown in graphic 2. 
 
Figure 3 
Tradeoff between real earnings management and accrual earnings 
management from 1993 until 2013 
 
Evidence of changing in earnings management techniques in Indonesia showed 
existed regulations or accounting standards were not able to prevent earnings 
management. Therefore, it is expected that there is the regulatory reformation which 
can restrict even prevent earnings management practices. 
The results of this study can be used as an input for both investors and auditors 
to be aware of earnings management practices. Earnings management practices need to 
be considered by investors in making investment decisions. 
This study used a sample of 31 (thirty-one) companies. The limited number of 
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samples is because very few companies listed on the Indonesian Stock 
Exchange from 1991 and remained registered until 2014, along with the insufficiencies 
of existing data. This study did not conduct tests on calculation models of discretionary 
accrual that it is not known exactly which model is able to produce the highest adjusted 
R-square. 
Conclusion, Limitation and Suggestion 
This research conducted was based on the author’s interest in the studies done 
by Cohen et al. (2008). Several conclusions that can be drawn from this research were 
it failed to prove the hypothesis in which trend of accrual earnings management 
increased during period time of research. The variable time didn’t show significant 
impact on increasing trend of accrual earnings management. 
Practice of accrual earnings management in Indonesia that tends fluctuate 
shows there is a substitution or change of earnings management technique from accrual 
to real one. Zang (2007) also proves that managers use real earnings management and 
accrual earnings management interchangeably (substitution). The risk managers may 
face when doing accrual earnings management is it is easily detected by the auditors. 
Thus, to avoid such risk, managers chose real earnings management. 
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